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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE
STATE OF UTAH

DONALD V. TOLMAN,
Plaintiff and Appellant,

)
Case No. 14,625

VS.

K-MART ENTERPRISES OF UTAH, INC.,
a Utah corporation, and JEFF T.
DONG,
Defendants and Respondents.

)
)
)

STATEMENT OF THE NATURE OF THE CASE
This is an action for damages for embarrassment,
humiliation and disgrace arising out of the false arrest
of plaintiff.
DISPOSITION IN THE LOWER COURT
This matter was decided upon defendants' Motion
for Summary Judgment.

From a summary judgment for

defendants of no cause of action the plaintiff appeals.
NATURE OF RELEASE SOUGHT ON APPEAL
The appellant seeks to have judgment of the
Court reversed and a trial granted to determine evidence
and to determine damages.
STATEMENT OF FACTS
On November 16, 1974, Plaintiff Donald V. Tolman
entered the place of business of Defendant K-Mart Enterprises
-1-

of Utahf Inc. (hereinafter referred to as "K-Mart") for the
purpose of purchasing a can of body putty.
directly to the automotive department.

He proceeded

After examining

several different brands he selected a can and proceeded
to the front of the store.

Before arriving at the checkout

counter he noticed that there were two price tags on the
can.

He returned to the automotive department and picked

out another kit and started walking towards the checkout
counter. As he was standing in line, he noticed that there
were two (2) labels on this kit too.

Plaintiff was in a

hurry and rather than walk back to the automotive department
and look for a can with only the lower price, he just
peeled off the label with the higher price.

He then paid

for the item and proceeded to leave the store.
At this point Defendant Jeff Dong stopped plaintiff
and informed him he was a security officer.
that he was under arrest.

He told plaintiff

Plaintiff asked what it was that

he had supposedly done to which Defendant Dong stated that
that was what they all said.
Defendant Dong then called to another employee—the
store manager—in a loud voice saying that he has just arreste
plaintiff because plaintiff had tried to defraud K-Mart.
The store manager asked plaintiff if he would walk t
the back of the store and not cause any disturbance.

The

store manager and Defendant Dong then escorted plaintiff to
the rear of the store with one walking in front and the other

-2-

to plaintiff's side.

Plaintiff was made to empty his pockets

and then they asked to see the package.

Defendant Dong took

out the car body kit that plaintiff had just purchased
and stated that he had seen plaintiff taking labels off
containers and putting them on other items.

Plaintiff

objected and offered to take defendants to the area he had
bought the item and show them that there were other kits
that also had more than one price tag.

However, defendants

refused to go and examine the other body kits.
At this time. Defendant Dong produced a form
which purportedly relieved K-Mart of any liability or
responsibility for plaintifff's arrest.

Defendants

requested palintiff to sign said form with the additional
impetus that if he would sign it the judge would be
easier on plaintiff.

Plaintiff refused to sign, at which

time he was informed that if he did not they were going
to call the police.

However, defendants did not call the

police right then, but continued to try and convince
plaintiff to sign the release of liability.
Finally the police were called and plaintiff
was escroted to the front of the store and when outside
was handcuffed and placed in the seat of the police car
and escorted to the Orem City Jail.

Here he was photographed

and booked.
Plaintiff remained at the jail approximately
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one and one-half (1 1/2) hours before being released
on bail.

He went to Brigham Young University where,

after telling his brother what had happened, they
returned to K-Mart to purchase another of the kits
as evidence.

However, all of approximately two dozen

of the same kits had been removed and there remained
only an empty space.

At the criminal trial plaintiff

was found not guilty and several items were placed in
evidence, which had two or three and as many as six or
eight price tags on a single item as claimed by plaintiff,
all different prices.
Defendants1 Motion for Summary Judgment was granted
upon the basis that Section 78-11-29, Utah Code Annotated,
1953, as amended, which reads as to actions for false
imprisonment is applicable to actions for false arrest.
Plaintiff asserts:

(1) that false imprisonment and false

arrest are not the same and 12) therefore, false arrest
should be governed by Section 78-12-25, Utah Code Annotated,
19 53, as amended, which provides that "an action for relief
not otherwise provided for by law" shall be brought within
four years.
POINT I
FALSE ARREST AND FALSE IMPRISONMENT ARE NOT THE
SAME CAUSES OF ACTION
Black's Law Dictionary defines arrest as:
"To deprive a person of his liberty by
legal authority. Taking under real or
assumed authority, custody of another
for the purpose of holding or detaining
-4-

him to answer a criminal charge
or civil demand."
Imprisonment on the other hand is defined by
Blackfs Law Dictionary as:
The act of putting or confining a
man in prison; the restraint of a
man's personal liberty; coercion
exercised upon a person to prevent
the free exercise of his powers of
locomotion.
Thus, it is apparent that there does exist
some difference between false arrest and false imprisonment due to the very differences in the meaning of the
two words.
As further evidence of the difference in
meaning, plaintiff-appellant cites Fuller v. Zinik
Sporting Goods Co., (1975) 538 P.2d 1036, where plaintiff
brought suit for false arrest, false•imprisonment and
malicious prosecution.

Thompson v. General Finance Co.,

(1970) 205 Kan. 76, 468 P.2d 269, speaks of an action for
false arrest or for false imprisonment.
In many of the false imprisonment cases, they
speak of false arrest or false imprisonment cases.
Obviously there must be a distinction between the two or
else it would be unnecessary to mention false arrest in
connection with false imprisonment.
That a distinction between false arrest and
false imprisonment does exist is apparent from the
-5-

opinion in Ogulin v. Jeffries, (1953) 121 Cal. App.2d 211, 263
P.2d 75, which cites the following at page 78:
A person detained pursuant to a lawful
arrest cannot bring an action for the
false arrest itself, Stubbs v. Abercrombic,
42 Cal. App. 170, 183 P. 458. However,
an action for false imprisonment arising
from unlawful detention may be maintained
if the defendant unlawfully detains the
prisoner for an unreasonable period of time
and unnecessarily delays taking him before
a magistrate within a reasonable time after
his arrest. Williams v. Zelzah Warehouse
Co., 126 Cal. App. 28, 14 P.2d 177, Section
849 Penal Code, Section 145 Penal Code,
Vernon v. Plumas Lumber Co., 71 Cal. App.
112, 234 P. 869, 35 C.J.S. False Imp. § 51,
P. 582; Roseman v. Korb, 311 Mass 75, 4U NE"-*a
255.
This is cited as correct in Kaufman v. Brown, (1949)
93 Cal. App.2d 508, 209 P.2d 156.
A further distinction between the two is cited
in McGlone v. Landreth, (1948) 200 Okla 425; 195 P.2d
268.
As stated in 22 Am. Jur. , Section 3, there is
a distinction in the manner in which causes of action for
false arrest and false imprisonment arise.

The distinction

is there stated as follows at page 354:
In a false arrest, false imprisonment
exists, but the detention is by reason
of an asserted legal authority to
enforce the processes of the law; in
a false imprisonment, the detention is
purely a matter between private persons
for a private end, and there is no
intention of bringing the person detained
before a Court, or of otherwise securing
the administration of the law.
-6-

This is further cited in Allsup v. Skaggs Drug
Center, (

) 203 Okla 325, 223 P.2d 530.
Though not controlling in the instant case it

should be noted that the Statute of Limitations of Pennsylvania
12 P.S. § 31 states:
Actions of trespass, of assault, menace,
battery, wounding, imprisonment or any
of them, within two years next after the
cause of such actions or suits and not
after
In 12 P.S. § 51:
Evexy suit to recover damages for malicious
prosecution or for false arrest, ^ust be
brought within one year from the date of
the occurrance of such right of action, and
not thereafter.1
This points up the fact that at least one legislature had
recognized the fact that there is a distinction between false
arrest and false imprisonment.

The Pennsylvania legislature

has seen fit to impose different limitations on each of
this causes of action.
The leading Utah case on the distinction existing
between false arrest and false imprisonment is Hepworth v.
Covey Bros. Amusement Co., (1939) 97 Utah 205, 91 P.2d 507.
Wherein at page 599 it states:
We wish to invite attention to a
distinction in the law which we believe
has been confused in the briefs. False
arrest may be committed only by one who
has legal authority to arrest or who
has pretended legal authority to arrest.
False imprisonment may be committed by
anyone who imprisons without legal right.
One who commits a false arrest of another
-7-

may be liable in damages for false imprisonment, but from this we must not reason that
if there is a failure of proof of false
arrest of necessity there is a failure of
proof of false imprisonment. False arrest
is merely one means of committing a false
imprisonment. False imprisonment may be
committed without any thought of attempting
an arrest.
Though the distinctions are fine, it is apparent tha
the distinction does exist. A further quotation from a
footnote in Banles v. Food Town, (1957), 98 So.2d 719 at
page 721:
In the false or unlawful arrest, the
detention is by reason of an asserted
legal authority to enforce the processes
of law; it is one means of committing a
false imprisonment, although a false
imprisonment Cwhich includes an unreasonable detention) may be committed without
an arrest. 35 C.J.S. False Imprisonment
§ 2,6; 22 Am Jur. False Imprisonment § 3
POINT II
THE STATUTE OF LIMITATIONS IS TO BE CONSTRUED SO AS
TO INCLUDE ONLY THOSE CASES CLEARLY WITHIN THE
STATUTORY PROVISIONS
The purpose of statutes of limitations is to give
timely notice to an adverse party so he can assemble a defense
when the facts are fresh.

This is cited in Elkins v. Derby,

(1974) 115 Cal. Rptr. 641, 525 P.2d 81, at page 86:
That the purpose in the oft-quoted
words of Justice Holme is to *[prevent]
surprises through the revival of claims
that have been allowed to slumber until
evidence has been lost, memories have
faded and witnesses have disappeared.'
In Los Angeles County v. Security First National
-8-

Bank of L.A., (1948)

84 Cal. App.2d 575, 191 P.2d 78 f

at page 82:
Statutes of limitations are designed
to prevent the resurgence of stale
claims after the lapse of long periods
of time as a result of which loss of
papers, disappearance of witnesses,
feeble recollections, make ineffectual
or extremely difficult a fair presentation
of the case. But they are not intended
as defenses to just demands of comparatively
recent origin. When the facts relied upon
leave it clearly in doubt whether the
case is within the statute pleaded courts
should not indulge a strained construction
in order to support the plea. McGrath v.
Butt County, 30 Cal.App. 2d 734,
738, 87 P.2d 381.
The various Supreme Courts of sister states have
gone on to declare from this statement of the general purposes
of the statutes of limitation that the facts of the case must
clearly bring it within the provisions of the law sought to
be applied.
In Mowry v. City of Virginia Beach, (1956) 198 Va
205, 93 SE 2d 323, it states at page 326:
It is generally held that statutes of
limitations are ordinarily favored and
are entitled to a reasonable construction;
but they may not be applied to cases not
clearly within their provisions. Their
determination is not governed by equitable
questions but by the language of the statute
construed according to the manifest intention
of the legislature, and, when free from
ambiguity, should be construed according
to the usual meaning of the words and as
a whole. 53 C.J.S. Limitations of Actions,
§ 36 P. 910 and 34 Am. Jur. Limitations of
Actions, § 37, page 40.
Bradford v. City of Shreveport, (1974) 294 S.2d 855,
at page 859:
-9-

It is well settled that prescriptive
statutes are strictly construed and the
facts of the case must bring the action
clearly within specific provisions of the
law sought to be applied. Prescription
cannot be extended by analogy from one
subject to another. (citations omitted)
In Pugneir v. Ramharter, (1957) 275 Wis 70, 81
NW2d 38, 81 ALR 2d 522 at page 528, a statute of limitations
was announced as a defense against an action against a
town chairman.

The statute referred to a three year

limitation or actions against a sheriff, coroner, town clerk
or constable for breach of duty.

The Court ruled that an

action against a town chairman was not banned by this
statute.

It then >7ent on to say:
A statute of limitations should not be
applied to cases not clearly within
its provisions. It should not be
extended by construction. 53 C.J.S.
Limitations of Actions § 3(b), pp 912-913.
Statutes creating limitations are to
be reasonably and fairly construed, but
should not be extended by construction.
Fish v. Collins, (1916) 164 Wis. 457,
160 N.W. 163.
United Carbon Co. v. Mississippi River Fuel Corp. (1

89 So.2d 209, 230 La 709 at 212:
It is equally well settled that prescriptive
statutes are strictly construed, and the
facts of the case must bring the action
clearly within the specific provisions of
the law sought to be applied.
(citations
omitted)
It has been further stated in Williams v. Bailey
COkla) (1954) 26b p.2d 868, at page 873:

-10-

It is a postulate that a limitations
statute
only the particular
actions which it recites,, and no others,
and that a statute can be given such force
only as the Legislature could impart
to it within the limitations of the State
and Federal Constitutions.
This view was again cited in Roberts v. Roberts,
(Wyo) (1945) 162 p.2d 117 at 121:
It was said in an early case that 'the
doctrine is well established in the
construction of Statutes of Limitations
that cases within the reason, but not
within the words of the statute are not
barred, but may be considered as omitted
cases, which the legislature have not
deemed proper to limit . . . Nor is this
doctrine at war with that so frequently
held in the books, that the statute is
to be liberally expounded.
In 37 C.J.S. 691, it is said that:
It is a familiar principle that a statute
of limitations should not be applied to
cases not clearly within its provisions;
it should not be extended by construction.
In Hatch v. Spofford, 26 Conn. 432, 438
a case cited by Wood, supra, it is said
that statutes of limitations are "to
be construed and applied, according to
the exact and specific language of the
enactments, and not upon any supposed
general and abstract principles of
equity. Courts may not extend them
to cases, because they seem to be of
an analogous character.
Another case which follows this reasoning is
Gibson v. Gibson, (1966) 240 Ark. 827, 402 SW 2d 647 where
at page 648 the court stated:
We note at the outset of this discussion
that this court has many times expressed
its reluctance to apply a statute of
limitations to actions not specifically
enumerated therein.
-11-

The statute of

limitations as a defense has

been further limited in other sister states.
Cannavina y.

Poston, (1942) 13 Wash.2d 182, 124

P.2d 787 at page 789:
While we have long recognized the rule
in this state that a plea of the statute
of limitations is not an unconscionable
defense, we have also recognized and so
stated that it is fnot such a meritorious
defense that either the law or the fact
should be strained in aid of it1. Bain v.
Wallace, 167 Wash. 583, 10 P.2d
ZZb, 278 [emphasis supplied]
This view of the statute of limitations has been
followed in Hardbarger v. Deal, (1962) 258 N.C. 31,
127 SE 2d 771; Guy F. Atkinson Co. v. State of Washington,
(1965) 66 Wash.2d 576, 403 P.2d 880; Rochester v. Tulp,
(1959) 54 Wash.2d 71, 337 P.2d 1062; Wickwire v. Heard,
(1951) 37 Wash.2d 748, 226 P.2d 192, 23 ALR 2d 1323.
In Gibson, supra, paqe 649, the court cited from
Breining v. Lipincott, 126 Ark. 77, 187 SW ""2d 915, page 916:
The statute is plain and the intent
of the legislature must be gathered
from the words rised and where the
words rised are unambiguous, courts
cannot add to or take from them their
obvious meaning.
In an Iowa case, Sprung v. Rasmussen, (1970),
180 NW. 2d 430 at 433, the court said:
Courts do not favor defense of statute of
limitations and statutes of limitations
should not be applied to cases which do
not come within their provisions.
Pugnier v. Ramharter, 275 Wis 70, 81
NW"2d 38
-12-

The contention as expressed in Point I of this
brief is that there are differences which exist between
false arrest and false imprisonment.

These differences

should be recognized and as stated in the cases above,
since false arrest is not specifically enumerated, it
must come not under the one year statute of limitations,
but rather under the four year general statute of limitations
for all other types of actions.
In deciding upon this important matter, it is
well for the Court to remember what was stated veiy well
in Hotaling v. General Electric Co., (1962) (N.Y.) 16 A.2d
339, 228^.Y.S.2d 376 at page 379:
Statutes of limitations are construed,
where possible, so as to give the parties
their day in court, and should not be
defeated by overstrict construction such
as the appellants would have us adopt in
the present action.
Though in the other cases it has been stated that
statutes of limitations should be strictly construed, this
states that they should not be so overstrict that they
preclude a party to his day in court.

This view was

further endorsed in Callarama v. Associates Discount Corp.
of Delaware, (1972) 329

N.Y.S.2d 711, 69 Misc.2d 287.

In order to allow plaintiff his day in court the
Court should operate on that oft-cited maxim of laws that
If a substantial doubt exists as to which
is the applicable statute of limitations,
the longer rather than the shorter period
of limitations is to be preferred. Hardings
Co. v. Eimco Corp, 1 Utah 2d 320
266 P.2d 494 at 323, citing 34 Am Jur,
Limitations of Action, § 50.
-13-

This is further manifested in Sprung v« Rasmussen,
supra, at page 433:
Where two
involved,
period to
preferred

statutes of limitations are
the one giving the longer
a litigant seeking relief is
and applied.

The Court should note a case from New York, Huff v.
State of New York, (1965) 263 N.Y. 2d 897, which stands for
the proposition that although the claim arose at the time
plaintiff was released from imprisonment and he must therefor
serve a claim for false arrest against the state within ninety
(90) days, the claim did not accrue until the claimant could
fairly ascertain the damages he has sustained.
The expression "claim accrued" is not identical
with the expression "cause of action arose".

The claim accrue-

when it matures, and the words "claim accrued" have the same
meaning as "damages accrued".
The claim did not accrue until the time of acquittal
In applying these rules, it should be remembered
by the Court that plaintiff was arrested on November 16, 19 74.
The matter came to trial on February 25, 1975 and the
Complaint in the matter was filed December 16, 1975, only
one month past the claimed one year statute of limitations.
Therefore, the Court in seeking to determine the applicable
statute of limitations should see that only 10 months had
passed since the termination of the trial in this matter.
no way is that a time in which'Witnesses could disappear,
notes be lost and memories have faded."
-14-

In

POINT III
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN GRANTING SUMMARY JUDGMENT BASED
UPON STATUTES OF LIMITATIONS WITHOUT SUBMITTING THE
MATTER FOR TRIAL AND WITHOUT THE TAKING OF EVIDENCE
Rule 9(h) of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure provides
as follows:
In pleading the statute of limitations it
is not necessary to state the facts showing
the defense but it may be alleged generally
that the cause of action is barred by the
provisions of the statute relied on, referring
to or describing such statute specifically
and definitely by section number, subsection
designation, if any, or otherwise designating
the provision relied uopn sufficiently clearly
to identify it. If such allegation is
controverted, the party pleading the statute
must establish, on the trial, the facte
showing that the cause of action is so barred,
{emphasis supplied]
Bv the rules of procedure where the allegations of
statute of limitations or defense of statute of limitations
is asserted, if controverted by the plaintiff, the facts showing
that the cause of action is barred must be established at the
trial upon the basis of the evidence presented.

In this case

now before the Court the trial court was premature in granting
summary judgment of dismissal without hearing the evidence and
making an evaluated distinction whether the action was one for
false arrest, humiliation and damages or a simple case of
false imprisonment as claimed by the plaintiff.
CONCLUSION
The summary judgment to the defendants and against
plaintiff in this action is contrary to the public policy
of the courts in this state in allowing each litigant his
-15-

day in court and the opportunity to present the substance
of this case to an impartial jury.

Plaintiff respectfully

requests and asks the Supreme Court to reverse the ruling
of the trial court and remand the case for trial.
Respectfully submitted this 1st day of September,
1976.

M. Dayle Jefcs
MAILING CERTIFICATE
I HEREBY CERTIFY that a copy of the foregoing
Brief of Appellant was mailed to Allen Larson of Worsley,
Snow & Christensen, at 700 Continental Bank Building, Salt
Lake City, Utah 84101, by placing a copy of same in the
U. S. Mails postage prepaid, this 1st day of September, 1976,
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